A New Heuristic in Mutual Sequential Mate Search by Saglam, Ismail
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A New Heuristic in Mutual Sequential
Mate Search
Ismail Saglam
Ankara, Turkey
28 May 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79448/
MPRA Paper No. 79448, posted 30 May 2017 04:37 UTC
A New Heuristic in Mutual Sequential
Mate Search
Ismail Saglam
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new heuristic to be used as a mate search
strategy in the Todd and Miller’s (1999) human mate choice model. This heuristic,
which we call Take the Weighted Average with the Next Desiring Date, is a plausible
search rule in terms of informational assumptions, while in terms of mating likelihood
it is almost as good as the most successful, yet also unrealistic, heuristic of Todd
and Miller (1999), namely the Mate Value-5 rule, which assumes that agents in the
mating population completely know their own mate values before interacting with
any date. The success of our heuristic stems from its extreme power to lead an
average agent in the mating population to always underestimate his/her own mate
value during the adolescence (learning) phase of the mating process. However, this
humble heuristic does not perform well in terms of marital stability. We find that
the mean within-pair difference is always higher under our heuristic (possibly due to
high estimation errors made in the learning phase) than under any heuristic of Todd
and Miller (1999). It seems that becoming ready to pair up with agents whose mate
values are well below one’s own mate value pays off well in the mating phase but
also incurs an increased risk of marital dissolution.
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1 Introduction
A seminal work by Todd and Miller (1999) studies the human mate choice with the
help of a boundedly rational model where agents follow a simple heuristic (feedback
rule) as their mate search strategies. This model involves two phases, the first of
which is called the adolescence phase. Agents who have homogeneous preferences
over the agents of the opposite sex randomly interact with a number of dates se-
quentially in this phase and inform each of their dates regarding whether he/she was
found desirable. Using these feedbacks, agents adjust their aspiration levels after ev-
ery interaction according to some rule used by the whole population. In the second
phase, called the mating phase, agents randomly interact with potential mates and
decide whom to make a proposal. At each stage of this phase, every pair of agents
are removed from the mating pool as a married couple if they have simultaneously
proposed to each other. The mating phase ends after a stage at which either the
mating pool contains no agents or no pair of agents inside the mating pool can form
a married couple.
The adjustment rules used in the adolescence phase are five simple heuristics,
called Take the Next Best, Mate Value-5, Adjust Up/Down, Adjust Relative, and
Adjust Relative/2. According to Take the Next Best, each agent has an initial
aspiration level of zero and after each instance of dating sets his/her aspiration to
the mate value of his/her date provided that this date is desirable, i.e., the mate
value of this date exceeds his/her previous aspiration level. Under Mate Value-5,
each agent always sets his/her aspiration level to a constant value that is lower
than his/her own mate value by the value of 5. The other three adjustment rules
set the initial aspiration level of each agent to the average mate value. Of these
rules, Adjust Up/Down requires that each agent adjusts at each instance of dating
his/her aspiration upwards (downwards) by a constant parameter if he/she is found
by his/her date desirable (non-desirable). The Adjust Relative Rule is a modification
of Adjust Up/Down with mutual desirability taking place of desirability. Under this
rule, an agent raises (reduces) his/her aspiration level by a constant parameter, if
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he/she and his/her date find each other desirable (non-desirable). In other possible
cases, agents make no adjustments. Finally, the rule of Adjust Relative/2 is similar to
Adjust Relative with the difference that for each agent the adjustment parameter at
any instance of dating is equal to the difference between his/her previous aspiration
level and the mate value of his/her present date.
Computer simulations of Todd and Miller (1999) for the mate search model de-
scribed above show that the mating likelihood, as measured by the number of mated
pairs in the population, becomes always highest under the rule of Mate Value-5,
extremely differing from the other rules. In addition, with respect to a notion of
mating stability that is measured by the mean within-pair difference in mate value,
mated pairs formed always become more stable under Mate Value-5 than under Ad-
just Up/Down, Adjust Relative, and Adjust Relative/2. In fact, Mate Value-5 also
performs better than Take the Next Best when the adolescence length is short to
medium. Overall, Mate Value-5 becomes the best search rule both in paring up a
great proportion of the population and in pairing up agents with almost identical
mate values. But, unfortunately, this rule has a very serious problem. It is based
on the unrealistic assumption that each agent enters the adolescence phase of mate
search by already knowing his/her own mate value, while one should be aware of the
fact that:
“Knowing one’s own mate value is not necessarily an easy thing. We
cannot be born with it, because it is both context sensitive (it depends on
the others around us) and changes over time as we develop. We cannot
simply observe ourselves to determine it, because we do not see ourselves
in the same way that the others who judge us as potential mates see us.
We do not even know the proper criteria on which to judge ourselves
from the perspective of the opposite sex. Without this initial knowledge,
then, we must somehow estimate our own mate value, if we are to use it
to form our aspiration level.” (Todd and Miller, 1999, pp. 303-304)
In line with the above view, all search rules of Todd and Miller (1999), apart from
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the self-centered and unrealistic rule of Mate Value-5, have the goal of correctly es-
timating one’s own mate value to use it as a proxy for one’s own aspiration level. Of
these rules, Adjust Relative/2 becomes superior to the other realistic rules of Todd
and Miller (1999) with respect to a success measure that appropriately balances the
likelihood and stability of matings. However, if the individual performances of Adjust
Relative/2 and Mate Value-5 are compared, one can see, irrespective of the adoles-
cence length, around two-fold difference between the mating likelihoods generated by
these two search rules always in favor of Mate Value-5. Clearly, Adjust Relative/2,
which is plausible as a rule, is not a successful alternative to the unrealistic rule of
Mate Value-5. This brings us to the following question: Can we find a heuristic that
is plausible and that is almost as successful as Mate Value-5 in terms of likelihood
of mating? The answer we provide in this paper is ‘yes’. We introduce a realistic
heuristic, which we call Take the Weighted Average with the Next Desiring Date,
yielding almost as high likelihood of mating as Mate Value-5, especially when the
adolescence length is long.
Our work, which closely follows Todd and Miller (1999), can be located within a
strand of literature which models human mate search with the help of some dating
phase where agents can approximate their own mate values by using feedbacks from
potential mates they date (see, for example, Dombrovsky and Perrin, 1994; Mazalov
et al., 1996; Todd, 1997; and Collins et al., 2006). Two related works recently ap-
peared in this literature are Shiba (2013) and Saglam (2014). Shiba (2013) extends
the symmetric two-sided sequential mate search model of Todd and Miller (1999)
to an asymmetric case (of firm or job with worker mating), and evaluates how the
mating outcome changes when the two sides of the mating population use different
adjustment rules (with one of the sides, the firms, using Mate Value-5 and the other
side, the workers, using Adjust Relative/2). Findings of this study involve that the
likelihood and stability of mating are similar under the symmetric and asymmet-
ric cases, while the average value of successful agents (workers) are higher under
the asymmetric case, pointing to the failure of agents with relatively low values in
finding mates (jobs). Saglam (2014) studies a similar robustness problem regarding
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whether any search rule of Todd and Miller (1999) can be used as a Nash (1950)
equilibrium strategy by the whole population so that no agent would have an incen-
tive to unilaterally deviate from that search rule to any other rule so as to increase
the likelihood of his/her mating. Simulations of Saglam (2014) show that in terms of
this game-theoretical stability concept, Adjust Relative on average performs better
than the other four search rules of Todd and Miller (1999).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model
which we borrow from Todd and Miller (1999). We present five simple heuristics
(search rules) introduced by Todd and Miller (1999) for this model in Section 3,
where we also explore why some of these heuristics are more successful than the
others. In Section 4 we introduce our new heuristic and in Section 5 we evaluate its
performance by computer simulations. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Model
We borrow our model from the mutual sequential mate search model of Todd and
Miller (1999). This model considers a set of agents, N = {1, 2, . . . , 2n}, involving n
males and n females each of whom search for some mate from opposite sex. Each
agent has a mate value which is always unknown to himself/herself while completely
observable to any agent interacted in any phase of mate search. The mate value of
agent i, denoted by v(i), is randomly drawn from the uniformly distributed values
over some interval [0, V ] that is common for all agents.
Mate search involves two phases: the adolescence phase and the mating phase.
Agent i enters the adolescence phase with an initial aspiration level, denoted by
a(i, 0), and then randomly and sequentially meets a fixed number of dates of opposite
sex. This fixed number is common for all agents and denoted by the integer S ≥ 1,
implying that the adolescence phase consists of S stages of dating. At each stage s =
1, . . . , S, agent i observes the mate value of his/her date d(i, s) and after comparing
this value with his/her aspiration level of the previous stage a(i, s−1), agent i decides
whether his/her date in stage s is desirable (as a potential mate). Next, agent i and
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his/her date d(i, s) in stage s exchange information as to whether they find each other
desirable. Finally, taking this information into account, agent i determines his/her
aspiration level, a(i, s), for stage s using some adjustment (feedback) rule commonly
used by the whole population. (We will describe the adjustment rules introduced
by Todd and Miller (1999) for the studied model in the next section.) After the
adolescence phase is over, agents enter the mating phase, where males and females
are randomly paired. Here, agent i observes the mate value of his/her partner and
compares it with his/her finalized aspiration level a(i, S) to decide whether to make a
proposal. If the agents in a random pair propose to each other, then they are mated
and removed from the mating pool. Otherwise, both agents become available for the
next stage. The mating phase ends when the mating pool becomes empty or each of
its member has already been paired with all potential mates inside the mating pool.
3 Aspiration-Adjustment Heuristics of Todd and
Miller (1991)
Below, we describe five aspiration-adjustment heuristics (or simply mate search
strategies) introduced by Todd and Miller (1991).
Take the Next Best Rule: Agent i sets the aspiration in stage s to the mate value
of his/her current date if agent i finds this date desirable, and makes no adjustment
otherwise.
a(i, s) =
 v(d(i, s)) if v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1) otherwise.
Mate Value-5 Rule: This rule sets the aspiration at the beginning of the adoles-
cence phase to the constant v(i) − 5, and does not change it. Thus, in any stage
s,
a(i, s) = v(i)− 5.
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This rule assumes that each agent knows his/her mate value.
Adjust Up/Down Rule: In stage t, agent i adjusts up the stage s− 1 aspiration
by the constant β¯ = (V/2)/(1 + S) if he/she is found desirable by the date d(i, s).
Otherwise, agent i adjusts down his/her aspiration of the previous stage by β¯.
a(i, s) =
 a(i, s− 1) + β¯ if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1),
a(i, s− 1)− β¯ otherwise,
Adjust Relative Rule: Here, there is the possibility of non-adjustment, as well.
Agent i adjusts up the stage s − 1 aspiration by the constant β¯ = (V/2)/(1 + S) if
agent i and the date d(i, s) find each other desirable. If neither of these two agents
finds his/her date desirable, then agent i adjusts down the stage s− 1 aspiration by
β¯. In other cases, agent i makes no adjustment.
a(i, s) =

a(i, s− 1) + β¯ if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1)− β¯ if v(i) < a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) < a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1) otherwise.
Adjust Relative/2 Rule: This is a modification of the Adjust Relative Rule in
that the size of adjustment in stage s is equal to the half of the difference between
the stage s− 1 aspiration level of individual i and the mate value of his/her date in
stage s; i.e., β(i, s) = |v(d(i, s))− a(i, s− 1)|/2.
a(i, s) =

a(i, s− 1) + β(i, s) if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1)− β(i, s) if v(i) < a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) < a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1) otherwise.
The initial aspiration level of agent i is assumed to be a(i, 0) = 0 under Take the
Next Best, a(i, 0) = v(i)− 5 under Mate Value-5, and a(i, 0) = V/2 under the other
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three rules.
To evaluate the performances of the mate search strategies described above, Todd
and Miller (1999) conducted a set of Monte Carlo simulations. One of the success
measures they used was the likelihood of mating, as represented by the number
of mated pairs formed in 100 potential pairs. Their simulations according to this
measure, which we have reproduced and illustrated in Figure 1, show that Mate
Value-5 dominates the other four rules, yielding an incomparably high likelihood of
mating for all values of adolescence length.
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Figure 1.
Under the other four search rules, the likelihood of mating is found to be around
50% for very low levels of adolescence length, while it quickly drops to almost zero
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under the rule of Take the Next Best as the adolescence length starts to increase.
In result, Take the Next Best is dominated by every other rule on average. Of the
remaining rules, Adjust Relative/2 performs mildly better than both Adjust Relative
and Adjust Up/Down for short to medium adolescence lengths, whereas the converse
becomes true when the adolescence length is large.
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Figure 2.
A second measure of success, introduced by Todd and Miller (1991), for assessing
mate search strategies is concerned with the stability of mating, as defined by the
mean within-pair difference in mate value. Rules that have lower scores with respect
to this measure are considered to perform better as they would lead to more stable
matings. The performances of the Todd and Miller’s (1991) mate search strategies
with respect to this second measure, according to our simulations, are illustrated in
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Figure 2 above. Once again, Mate Value-5 is found to be the best rule for short to
medium adolescence lengths, yielding an extremely low mean within-pair difference
in mate value. As a matter of fact, this rule yields more stable matings than the other
rules with the exception of Take the Next Best. Although Take the Next Best is the
worst rule with respect to the stability measure for very low adolescence lengths, it
becomes as good as Mate Value-5 and always dominates the other three rules when
the adolescence length is not very small. Over the same range of adolescence lengths,
it is also found that Adjust Relative/2 is always superior to Adjust Up/Down, which
on the other hand is always superior to Adjust Relative.
Taking Figure 1 and Figure 2 together, it is apparent that Mate Value-5 is the
best search rule both in paring up a great proportion of the population and in
pairing up agents with almost identical mate values. But, unfortunately, this rule is
based on the unrealistic assumption that each agent enters the adolescence phase of
mate search by already knowing his/her own mate value. As a matter of fact, this
unrealistic rule is a member of a class of humble search rules called Mate Value-α
where agents constantly underestimate their own mate values by the value α ≥ 0.
A limiting member of this class, Mate Value-0, is the search rule under which no
estimation errors are ever made. In the mutual sequential search model of Todd and
Miller (1991) (where the mate values of all males and females are drawn from the
same distribution and no agent, male or female, would desire to be paired up with
another agent who has a lower mate value than his/her aspiration level), a search
rule, like Mate Value-0, under which all agents always know/learn their own mate
values must yield a likelihood of mating as high as 100 percent and a mean within-
pair difference in mate value as low as zero. Given the moderate findings in Figures
1 and 2, we can infer that under no realistic search rule of Todd and Miller (1991)
agents can estimate their mate values with a high precision. We can further claim
that under some of Todd and Miller’s (1999) search rules, especially under Take the
Next Best, the estimation errors of agents must be extremely high if we are to posit a
positive link between the likelihood of mating and the precision of information agents
in the mating population obtain about their own mate values during the adolescence
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phase. Below, we will explore the existence of such a link.
Formally, we define the precision of information obtained by agents in the mating
population during the adolescence phase as the inverse of the root mean square error
(RMSE) they make in estimating their own mate values at the end of S stages of dat-
ing, i.e., RMSE = [
∑2n
i=1[v(i) − a(i, S)]2]1/2. In Figure 3, we plot RMSE generated
by each search rule of Todd and Miller (1991). Interestingly, there is a striking simi-
larity between Figure 2 and Figure 3. If the rule of Take the Next Best is excluded,
it is even possible to make -using these two figures- the generalization that a search
rule is more stable than another search rule if it yields a lower RMSE. The exception
with Take the Next Best is due to the fact that under this rule the aspiration of
each agent quickly converges to the highest mate value in the population. Hence,
under this rule most agents extremely overestimate themselves in the adolescence
phase. This implies that in the mating phase only a tiny fraction of the population
becomes able to find mates, while this fraction involves only some elite members
of the mating population who make almost no estimation errors. This is because
they have extremely high mate values and interacting a desirable date is therefore
very unlikely for them. Consequently, the mean within pair-difference in mate value
becomes very low under the Take the Next Best rule.
Another observation from Figure 3 is that RMSE becomes very low under Mate
Value-5, attaining a constant value of 5 by the definition of the rule. One can argue
that this finding is consistent with a claim stating that the lower the RMSE of agents
in estimating their own mate values, the more successful a search rule in terms of
the mating likelihood. But, one should not rush to conclude, as this claim can be
easily rejected once one also considers the rule of Adjust Relative/2. Even though
the RMSE values calculated for Adjust Relative/2 and Mate Value/5 are almost the
same for medium to long adolescence lengths, there is a huge and puzzling difference
between the mating likelihoods of these two rules over the same range of adolescence
lengths, as one can recall from Figure 1.
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Figure 3.
To shed light on this puzzle, we report in Figure 4 our calculations for the mean
aspiration level of all agents at the end of the adolescence phase. Apparently, the
mean aspiration levels under the search rules of Adjust Up/Down, Adjust Relative,
and Adjust Relative/2 are always around the value of 50, which is also the mean level
of mate values of all agents. This should not be surprising though, since under each
of these three rules, where the initial aspiration level is 50, not only the upward and
downward adjustments are always of the same magnitude but also the conditions as
to when to make these adjustments are symmetric.
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Figure 4.
Comparing the performances of Mate Value-5 and Adjust Relative/2 in Figures
3 and 4 reveals that the precision of information acquired in the adolescence phase
of mating process, or the magnitude of estimation errors made by agents, is not a
sufficient indicator of the success of a mate search rule. Evidently, the direction in
which agents make estimation errors also matters. As a matter of fact, agents always
underestimate their own mate values under the search rule of Mate Value-5, while
the likelihoods of underestimating and overestimating can be inferred, from Figure
4, to be the same under Adjust Relative/2. So, it seems that the success of Mate
Value-5 stems from the humbleness of agents in setting their aspirations under this
rule always sufficiently below their own mate values.
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Overall, we can say that of the five search rules proposed by Todd and Miller
(1991) the most successful one, Mate Value-5, is not realistic while the other rules
do not lead to a level of learning -in the adolescence phase- that can ensure a high
likelihood of mating. This brings us to the following question: Can we find a simple
search rule which is not self-centered (and unrealistic) like Mate Value-5 and under
which mating is almost as likely as under Mate Value-5? We will explore this question
in the rest of our paper.
4 A New Aspiration-Adjustment Heuristic
Given our observations in the previous section as to the reasons underlying the rela-
tive success of Mate Value-5, we will consider a search rule that can be predicted to
yield humble aspirations. The initial aspiration level of each agent under this rule is
set to zero, and if an agent finds out that her date is desiring him/her in any stage
s of the adolescence phase, then he/she will set the stage-s aspiration level to the
weighted average of his/her aspiration in stage s − 1 and the mate value of his/her
date in stage s. Here, the relative weight of the stage s− 1 aspiration becomes equal
to the number of incidents that the condition for updating was satisfied until the end
of stage s− 1. Because of this, our weighted average rule actually sets the aspiration
level of any agent at any particular stage of dating precisely to the arithmetic aver-
age of the mate values of his/her all past dates satisfying the condition for updating.
More formally, this search rule is described as follows:
Take theWeighted Average with the Next Desiring Date (TWAN Desiring)
Rule: If agent i finds that his/her date in stage s is desiring him/her, then agent i
sets the stage-s aspiration to the weighted average of his/her stage s− 1 aspiration
and the mate value of his/her current date, using the respective weights of m/(m+1)
and 1/(m + 1) with m denoting the number of the previous stages (before stage s)
in which agent i was found desirable by his/her date. Otherwise, agent i makes no
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adjustment.
a(i, s) =

m
m+ 1
a(i, s− 1) + 1
m+ 1
v(d(i, s)) if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1),
a(i, s− 1) otherwise.
The above rule has two modifications over the Take the Next Best rule of Todd
and Miller (1999). One modification replaces the action of ‘taking the next satisfac-
tory date’ with ‘taking the weighted average with the next satisfactory date’, while
the other modification changes the condition as to when a date is found to be sat-
isfactory. Whereas under Take the Next Best an agent finds a date satisfactory if
he/she desires this date, under TWAN Desiring an agent finds a date satisfactory if
this date is desiring him/her.
Also note that under the rule of TWAN Desiring any agent with a positive mate
value will certainly be found desirable by his/her first date since the aspirations of all
agents are initially zero. Then, after the first stage of dating the aspiration level of
each agent will be positive with probability one. In fact, just because of this, starting
with the second dating stage, each agent will face the likelihood of being found non-
desirable by some of his/her dates. Since this likelihood is higher for agents with
lower mate values, these agents will have lower levels of aspirations on average, due
to the definition of the search rule. On the other hand, the lower is the mate value of
the date of an agent, the higher will be the likelihood that this agent will be found
desirable. As a consequence, interacting with a date will reduce the aspiration of
each agent on average. One can then predict for the whole population that starting
from some dating stage, the mean level of aspirations will always be below the mean
level of mate values and they will decrease as the number of interacted dates becomes
higher. We will be able to directly check this prediction in the next section.
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5 Simulations
We will measure the performance of our new search rule using computer simulations.
Like in Todd and Miller (1999), the value of N is set to 200 in our simulations to
consider a population involving 100 males and 100 females, and we assign all mate
values randomly from the uniformly distributed values in [0, V ] where V is set to
100. Also, we change the length of adolescence (the number of dates), S, from 1
to 90, and conduct 100 Monte Carlo simulations for each adolescence length. [All
simulations are conducted with the help of GAUSS Software Version 3.2.34 (Aptech
Systems, 1998). The source code of the simulation program and the resulting data
are available from the author upon request.]
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In Figure 5, we plot the mating likelihoods calculated under our new search rule
and the five search rules of Todd and Miller (1991). Apparently, TWAN Desiring
is outstandingly superior to any other search rule except for Mate Value-5 in terms
of mating likelihood. In addition, when the adolescence length is not extremely low,
an increase in the adolescence length improves the performance of TWAN Desiring,
and eventually, at very high levels of adolescence length, TWAN Desiring becomes
as good as Mate Value-5 or even slightly better.
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Figure 6.
To explore the secret behind the success of TWAN Desiring in terms of mating
likelihood, we report in Figure 6 our calculations for the mean aspiration levels of
all agents at the end of the adolescence phase under all search rules studied in this
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paper. Apparently, the mean aspiration level of all agents always attains its lowest
value under TWAN Desiring, quickly rising from the initial value of 0 to 43 after the
first five dates and smoothly reducing back to 36 when the number of dates increases
up to 90. Overall, Figures 5 and 6 make it clear that the success of a search rule
in terms of the mating likelihood is closely related to whether this rule is humble or
not, i.e. whether agents in the mating population set their aspirations on average
below their own mate values.
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Figure 7.
In Figure 7, we illustrate the performance of our new search rule with respect
to the stability measure described in Section 3. Interestingly, TWAN Desiring now
becomes always inferior to all search rules of Todd and Miller (1999) irrespective of
the adolescence length. Taking both Figure 5 and Figure 7 into consideration, we can
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say that both mating and divorcing are more likely under the rule TWAN Desiring
than under any other realistic search rule of Todd and Miller (1999). It seems that
being humble in mate search and becoming ready to pair up with agents whose mate
values are well below one’s own mate value pays off well in the mating phase but
also incurs an increased risk of marital dissolution.
Finally, we calculate RMSE for our new search rule and present it below in com-
parison to RMSE values we have previously calculated for the search rules of Todd
and Miller (1999).
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Figure 8.
Figure 8 shows that RMSE is higher under TWAN Desiring than under any
search rule of Todd and Miller (1991), except for Take the Next Best. Given the
19
extremely poor performance of TWAN Desiring in terms of the stability of mating
(as illustrated in Figure 7), Figure 8 supports our previous finding in Section 3
regarding the seemingly negative relationship between the estimation errors made in
the adolescence phase and the stability of mating.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to uncover why some of the simple heuristics
or search strategies in the Todd and Miller’s (1999) human mate choice model are
more successful than the others, and given our answer to this question we have
proposed a new heuristic that is in terms of mating likelihood as good as the most
successful, yet also unrealistic, heuristic of Todd and Miller (1999), namely Mate
Value-5. Regarding our first object, we have calculated, for each heuristic of Todd
and Miller (1999), the root mean square error (RMSE) made by all agents in the
mating population in estimating their own mate values in the adolescence phase of
the mating process. We have found that the estimation errors attain their lowest
values under Mate Value-5, while they are in general lower under Adjust Relative/2
than under the other realistic rules, namely Take the Next Best, Adjust Up/Down,
and Adjust Relative. In addition, the estimation errors under Adjust Relative/2 are
as low as they are under the unrealistic rule of Mate Value-5 when the adolescence
length is medium to long. This is quite puzzling given the huge difference between
the mating likelihoods generated by these two heuristics always in favor of Mate
Value-5. However, this puzzle vanishes away once we calculate the mean aspiration
levels of all agents. Whereas under Mate Value-5 the mean aspiration level is -by
definition- lower than the mean mate value of the population by the value of 5, it is
approximately equal to the mean mate value under Adjust Relative/2. This finding
indicates that the success of a heuristic may not be only related to the precision or
correctness of agents in estimating their own mate values in the adolescence phase
but also to their humbleness in making their estimations.
To realize our second object -the finding of a plausible heuristic that is comparable
20
to Mate Value-5 and superior to Adjust Relative/2 in terms of mating likelihood- we
have proposed a search rule, called Take the Weighted Average with the Next Desiring
Date (TWAN Desiring). Our simulations using this search rule have revealed that in
terms of the generated mating likelihood TWAN Desiring is outstandingly superior
to all realistic search rules of Todd and Miller (1991), including Adjust Relative/2.
As a matter of fact, TWAN Desiring is also almost as good as the unrealistic rule of
Mate Value-5 when the adolescence length is sufficiently long.
To understand the secret behind the success of TWAN Desiring in terms of mat-
ing likelihood, we have calculated the corresponding root mean square error made
by all agents in estimating their own mate values. We have found that RMSE for
TWAN Desiring is higher than RMSE for any search rule of Todd and Miller (1991),
except for Take the Next Best. This shows that the success of TWAN Desiring
in terms of mating likelihood cannot be attributed to the precision of information
agents obtain about their own mate values. As we have suspected that this success
is caused by the direction of estimation errors of agents like in the case of Mate
Value-5, we have also calculated the mean aspiration levels of all agents at the end
of the adolescence phase for all search rules studied in this paper. Interestingly, we
have found that the mean aspiration level of all agents always attains its lowest value
under TWAN Desiring, implying that this heuristic is even more humble than the
most humble (but unrealistic) heuristic of Todd and Miller, namely Mate Value-5.
Our findings have revealed that our new mate search rule has an undesirable
implication as well. With respect to a notion of stability, measured by the mean
within-pair difference in mate value, TWAN Desiring performs always worse than
any heuristic of Todd and Miller (1999). When agents become extremely willing
to pair up with agents whose mate values are below their own mate values, they
increase not only their chances of mating but also the likelihood they will divorce in
the future.
Taking stock of our results, both mating and divorcing are found to be more
likely under our humble search rule, called TWAN Desiring, than under any realistic
heuristic of Todd and Miller (1999). The future research may profitably search for
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plausible search rules under which not only the likelihood of mating but also the
stability of mating would become sufficiently high.
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